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There is now widespread acceptance of the universal coverage approach, presented in the 2010 World
Health Report. There are more and more voices for the beneﬁt of creating a single national risk pool.
Now, a body of literature is emerging on institutional design and organizational practice for universal
coverage, related to management of the three health-ﬁnancing functions: collection, pooling and pur-
chasing. While all countries can move towards universal coverage, lower-income countries face partic-
ular challenges, including scarce resources and limited capacity. Recently, the Lao PDR has been
preparing options for moving to a single national health insurance scheme. The aim is to combine four
different social health protection schemes into a national health insurance authority (NHIA) with a single
national fund- and risk-pool. This paper investigates the main institutional and organizational challenges
related to the creation of the NHIA. The paper uses a qualitative approach, drawing on the World Health
Organization’s institutional and Organizational Assessment for Improving and Strengthening health
ﬁnancing (OASIS) conceptual framework for data analysis. Data were collected from a review of key
health ﬁnancing policy documents and from 17 semi-structured key informant interviews. Policy makers
and advisors are confronting issues related to institutional arrangements, funding sources for the au-
thority and government support for subsidies to the demand-side health ﬁnancing schemes. Compulsory
membership is proposed, but the means for covering the informal sector have not been resolved. While
uniﬁcation of existing schemes may be the basis for creating a single risk pool, challenges related to
administrative capacity and cross-subsidies remain. The example of Lao PDR illustrates the need to
include consideration of national context, the sequencing of reforms and the time-scale appropriate for
achieving universal coverage.
 2013 Elsevier Ltd. Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.Introduction
While the goal of achieving universal coverage of the entire
population is accepted internationally (Chan, 2010; World Health
Organization, 2010), exactly how that is to be achieved within
lesser-developed countries (LDCs) is much less clear. LDCs present
particular challenges, including the difﬁculties of creating organiza-
tional capacityandof covering the large but disparate informal sector.
Establishing the most effective health ﬁnancing settings e revenue
collection, pooling of resources and purchasing of services e isal Health, The University of
a 3010, Australia. Tel.: þ61 3
d).
-NC-ND license.essential (Evans & Etienne, 2010; World Health Organization, 2005)
but does not provide thewhole answer. Amore pressing challenge is
to build national capacity for managing the complex tasks of pro-
viding social health protection (SHP) to the entire population by
developing the most effective institutional and organizational
structures. This is a key policy issue that remains unanswered by
current UC strategies; while a number of LDCs are feeling their way
towards UC, largely by trial and error, the evidence base for policy
making is weak.
Using tax funding, social insurance and other social protection
measures are offered as an effective approach that generates funds,
pools risk (Carrin& James, 2005; Evans&Etienne, 2010;WorldHealth
Organization, 2000) and protects against the impoverishing effects of
unpredictable expenditure (Carrin, 2004; Poleti et al., 2007; Ranson,
2002; Wagstaff, Watanabe, & van Doorslaer, 2001). While a broad
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(Carrin, 2004; Criel, 1998; Davies & Carrin, 2001; Dror & Jacquier,
1999; Soderlund & Khosa, 1997; World Health Organization, 2000),
establishing risk-pooling arrangements in lower-income countries
(LICs) is challenging (Ibrahimipour et al., 2011; Poleti et al., 2007;
Schieber & Maeda, 1997). There are also concerns that relying on
compulsory social health insurance (SHI) mechanisms for the (usu-
ally small) formal employed sector will not provide beneﬁts for the
poor or informal-sector workers (Gwatkin & Ergo, 2010).
In recent years, health planners in the Lao PDR have considered
options for combining four different social health protection (SHP)
schemes into a national health insurance authority (NHIA). The
aims are to expand population coverage, collect additional reve-
nues outside the government budget, overcome fragmentation and
achieve administrative efﬁciencies. The coverage and protection
provided by each of the four existing schemes remain incomplete,
resulting in a high level of out-of-pocket payment for health care.
Using the case of the Lao PDR, this article investigates the research
question: What are the challenges relating to institutional design
and organizational practice in creating a national health insurance
system in a low-income setting?
A body of literature is emerging on institutional design and
organizational practice for universal coverage. Davies and Carrin
(2001) acknowledged there was little evidence on the governance
and stewardship mechanisms needed to achieve national risk
pooling or tomeasure its impact. Some attempts have beenmade to
gather evidence about the institutional framework for government
health service delivery, including health ﬁnancing, personnel pol-
icies and administrative centralization (Oliveira-Cruz, Hanson, &
Mills, 2003). Building on a simple framework of key performance
indicators related to the three health ﬁnancing functions within the
context of social health insurance provided by Carrin and James
(2005), Carrin, Mathauer, Xu, and Evans (2008) proposed to inte-
grate institutional design for universal coverage into a conceptual
framework based on the three health ﬁnancing functions devel-
oped by Kutzin (2008). Mathauer and Carrin (2010, 2011) deﬁne
institutional design as formal rules and legal and regulatory pro-
visions and organizational practice as theway organizational actors
implement these rules.
Experience in several African, Asian and Latin American coun-
tries illustrates the need for institutional and organizational
development for universal coverage. The approach addresses con-
cerns over fragmentation of risk pools in various African countries
raised byMcIntyre et al. (2008). In Lesotho, for example, a review of
options for national social health insurance based its assumptions
for ﬁnancial feasibility projections on adopting an autonomous
para-statal agency covering all population groups, including com-
pulsory membership with contributions from the informal sector
and exemptions for the poor (Mathauer, Doetinchem, Kirigia, &
Carrin, 2007). Similarly, from 2004 Kenya planned a move from
a hospital insurance fund with community based health insurance
and other demand-side schemes to a single national social health
insurance fund (Chuma & Okungu, 2011), although questions of
economic feasibility and political acceptability have prevented the
adoption of the proposal (Carrin et al., 2007). Following extensive
experimentation in health ﬁnancing arrangements, fragmentation
also became a concern in Rwanda, posing the need to strengthen
institutional and organizational structures under a reformed na-
tional medical insurance agency (Antunes & Saksena, 2009).
In South-east Asia, harmonizing prepayment schemes has been
proposed for Lao PDR and Cambodia, where different schemes
target the poor, provide voluntary prepayment for the informal
sector and cover the small employed sector with compulsory in-
surance, challenging planners to ﬁnd the best way to construct
institutional arrangements for translating donor and governmentfunding into health-related services (Bloom et al., 2008;
Tangcharoensathien et al., 2011). One study in Cambodia concluded
that harmonization of the different schemes would require build-
ing the capacity of government organizations and investment in
institutional development (Antunes, Wanert, Bigdeli, & Ros, 2009).
A similar study recommends that Vietnam Social Security (a mixed
pension fund and health insurance agency) be reorganized and
technical and management capacity strengthened to provide for an
independent and professional health insurance system (Tien,
Phuong, Mathauer, & Phuong, 2011). Kwon (2011) concludes that
coverage of the large informal sector in Asian countries is a major
challenge and proposes an optimal mix of tax subsidies and health
insurance. One Latin American study argued that in Nicaragua
institutional and organizational deﬁcits had caused fragmentation
and segmentation of health ﬁnancing and resulted in excessive out-
of-pocket payments (Mathauer, Cavagnero, Vivas, & Carrin, 2010).
Social health protection in the Lao PDR
The Lao PDR is a low-income country where the poor and the
informal sector comprise 80% of the total population of 6 million,
out-of-pocket (OOP) spending is more than 60% of total health
expenditure, and government health spending is constrained (World
Bank, 2010a). In 2010, government expenditurewas only 33% of total
health expenditure and social security expenditure was only 5% of
government health expenditure (World Health Organization, 2012).
Currently, four different SHP schemes serve different sections of
the population (Thomé & Pholsena, 2009, chap. 3): the State Au-
thority for Social Security (SASS), a compulsory insurance scheme
for civil servants (Bouaphat, 2012; Ron & Jacobs, 2009); the Social
Security Ofﬁce (SSO), a compulsory insurance scheme for salaried
workers of both state and private enterprises, and, like the SASS,
implemented by the Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare
(MOLSW) (Bouaphat, 2012; Ron & Jacobs, 2009); Community-Based
Health Insurance (CBHI), a voluntary insurance scheme for the self-
employed and the informal sector implemented by the Ministry of
Health (MOH) (World Bank, 2010b); Health Equity Funds (HEFs),
a direct subsidy for families living in poverty to pay service fees and
associated costs at government facilities, managed under the MOH
by donor-funded non-government agencies (World Bank, 2010b).
The characteristics of the schemes are summarised in Table 1. The
different SHP schemes are constrained by fragmentation of
ﬁnancing pools and weak implementation arrangements, while
population coverage and beneﬁt packages vary widely (Herrera &
Roman, 2011). To date the schemes have not had a major impact
on reducing OOP spending (World Bank, 2010a).
The combination of the four SHP schemes into a single National
Health Insurance Authority (NHIA) has been proposed in a draft
Prime Minister’s Decree on National Health Insurance (Ofﬁce of the
Prime Minister, 2011). The draft Decree outlines the principles and
procedures for national health insurance and the organizational
structure of the NHIA. Revenue will be collected in a single national
pool through compulsory salary deductions from the formal sector,
with a 50% government subsidy for contributions from the informal
sector and a 100% government/donor subsidy for the poor, and the
NHIAwill purchase services from government health providers. The
NHIA is proposed as a state organization with department status
under the Ministry of Health, with an independent executive board,
board of director and administrative bodies. Its purpose is to deter-
mine policy for national health insurance, develop and implement
a strategic plan and regulations and build government capacity.
Also under consideration is a draft Health Financing Strategy
2011e2015 (Ministry of Health, 2010). The wide-ranging strategy
includes proposals for increased public-health spending from do-
mestic sources and recommends developing a plan to merge the
Table 1
Summary of social health protection schemes in the Lao PDR.
SASS SSO CBHI HEFs All schemes
Ministerial authority MOLSW MOLSW MOH MOH MOLSW, MOH
Year est. 2006 (revised scheme) 2001 2002 2004
Legal tool PM decree PM decree MOH regulation
(national regulation)
MOH regulations are
project based
Target population Civil servants and dependents,
retirees, military personnel
Employees of
enterprises and
dependents
Informal sector, non-poor,
self-employed and dependents
Households identiﬁed
as poor by each HEF
Total population
Geographical coverage National (17 provinces covered) 7 provinces are
covered
Currently in 26 districts of 10
provinces with the
expansions planned
Currently in 98 districts
with expansions planned
Contribution Gov’t and employee
salary deductions
Employer and
employee salary
deductions
Household premium payment Donor and gov’t subsidies
Purchasing of services Principally capitation payment
to gov’t service providers
Principally capitation
payment to gov’t
service providers
Principally capitation payment
to gov’t service providers
Typically fee-for-service
reimbursement to gov’t
service providers
Estimated number of
persons in the target
population
450,000 persons
(excluding about
590,000 military and
police and their dependents)
386,988 persons 3 million persons 1.6 million persons 6 million
Coverage as of 2012 355,272 124,583 140,000 713,944 1,333,799
% of targeted population 79 32 5 45 22
Abbreviations: SASS, State Authority for Social Security; SSO, Social Security Ofﬁce; CBHI, Community Based Health Insurance; HEF, Health Equity Fund; MOLSW, Ministry of
Labour and Social Welfare; MOH, Ministry of Health; PM, Prime Minister. Source: Bouaphat Phonvisay, Ministry of Health, Lao PDR, July 2012.
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work for a merged scheme and the ability to attract a skilled
workforce as unresolved issues. The Strategy calls for new measures
that replace the practice of basing health facility user-fee revenues
on pharmaceutical purchases through revolving drug funds (RDF),
which has caused strong incentives to government providers both to
over-prescribe medications and to withdraw from CBHI schemes
that impose capitation payment ceilings. Prepared for and on behalf
of the MOH, two further ‘roadmap’ documents recommend the
parallel development of compulsory and voluntary membership
schemes at the same sites, administered through the proposed NHIA
(Herrera & Roman, 2011; Ron & Jacobs, 2009). A ﬁrst step could be
the amalgamation of the SASS and SSO schemes within the MOLSW.Table 2
Characteristics of the key informants.
Sex Male 14
Female 3
Organizational focus Ministries 11
Development partners 5
National Institute for Public Health 1
Program implementation
role on social health
protection schemes?
Yes 7
No 10Methods
This paper uses data collected for a study of policy challenges
and organizational barriers associated with the creation of the
NHIA in the Lao PDR. In an analysis of the key policy documents, we
reviewed the draft Health Financing Strategy 2011e2015 (Ministry
of Health, 2010) and the draft Decree on National Health Insurance
(Ofﬁce of the Prime Minister, 2011) along with key documents
provided by government, national and donorepartner agencies
(Ministry of Health, 2011; World Bank, 2010a, 2010b, 2010c).
We interviewed 17 key informants working nationally at the
policy and operational level, purposively selected as those health
ﬁnancing policy makers who are known to have played an active
role in the formulation of policy and practice for SHP in Lao PDR and
who were available for interview. Table 2 summarises the charac-
teristics of these stakeholders from the ministries of health,
ﬁnance, and labour and social welfare and development partners.
We believe that the key informants are representative of the range
of views that are prevalent within government and among devel-
opment partners. Based on a semi-structured questionnaire, these
key informants provided their views about the creation of the
NHIA. The interviews were conducted in English and noted by hand
by the ﬁrst author in September 2011. Consent for the interview
was provided by all informants and participant comments were de-
identiﬁed. Ethical approval was not required to conduct policy
related 17 key informant interviews in the Lao PDR.The conﬂicting views of key informants were reported and no
attempt was made to resolve these differences (Brenzel & Naimoli,
2009). Our aim was to represent the variety of views faithfully,
reﬂecting an ongoing discussion among stakeholders with no clear
‘sides’ or counter-positions. Potentially, organizational attachments
may have an inﬂuence on the results: those assigned to manage the
CBHI system, for example, may have a stronger interest in describing
its implementation as a success; ofﬁcials at the SASS and the SSO
may have a vested interest in maintaining an independent structure.
However, we do not believe that these possible biases affect the
reporting of the results or the interpretation we bring to them.
Analysis of the data from the documentary review and key
informant interviews was guided by the World Health Organiza-
tion’s institutional and Organizational Assessment for Improving
and Strengthening health ﬁnancing (OASIS) conceptual framework
proposed by Mathauer and Carrin (2011) (Fig. 1). The OASIS
framework is based on an understanding that health ﬁnancing
performance depends on the institutional design and organiza-
tional practice of the health ﬁnancing system. The framework ﬁrst
analyses the stewardship functions of the MOH with respect to the
three health ﬁnancing functions: resource collection, pooling and
purchasing of services. For each category, the framework proposes
an analysis of institutional design and organizational practice that
in turn affect nine key health ﬁnancing performance indicators
(listed in Table 3 below). While the OASIS approach has so far been
usedmostly as ameans for country situation analysis, we argue that
e if issues related to context, sequencing and timescale are addede
the framework may also be used as an effective tool for planning
Fig. 1. The OASIS framework. Source: Mathauer and Carrin (2011)
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and human resources capacity for implementation of UC.
Sequencing refers to the order in which the major reforms are
implemented, and their content. Timescale refers to the likely
period of time, usually decades, required to achieve full UC.
Findings
Reponses from key informants were analysed under three
themes related to the creation of the NHIA: institutional design for
health ﬁnancing, organizational challenges and the potential impact
of the NHIA on health ﬁnancing performance. The ﬁndings reported
in this section exclusively reﬂect the views of the key informants.
Institutional design for health ﬁnancing
Stewardship and accountability
Key informants argued strong political leadership will be nee-
ded to bring change in policy, administration and implementation.
While key informants favoured the establishment of anautonomous authority, no clear agreement emerged on the location
of the NHIA: the Ofﬁce of the PrimeMinister (PM), theMOH and the
MOLSW were all suggested. The PM’s Ofﬁce was favoured as the
means to provide political leadership, strengthen coordination,
reduce tensions between ministries, and enforce monitoring. Key
informants from development partner agencies mostly rejected
locating the NHIA at the MOH (responsible for CBHI and HEFs) and
favoured theMOLSW (which administers the SASS and the SSO and
has greater human resource capacity), noting, however, that the
MOLSWmay not have an interest in coverage of the informal sector.
Resource mobilization
Key informants recognised that guaranteeing sufﬁcient funding
for the NHIA, including reliable and equitable collection of member
contributions, would be a major challenge. They reported proposed
government contributions were limited, compliance with SASS and
SSO procedures was currently incomplete, CBHI premium collec-
tion was low, and continued donor funding for HEF schemes was
not guaranteed. Most understood that funding increased coverage
of the informal sector is a particular challenge, as expanding
Table 3
Potential impact of the NHIA on the health ﬁnancing performance indicators.
# Indicators Possible impact Barriers
1 Level of funding Additional funding for subsidies will increase General
Government Expenditure on Health.
Higher collection of premium contributions through
enrolling new members from the informal sector.
No clear commitment from government and donors.
Low compliance in compulsory collections; difﬁculty
implementing a system of compulsory collection of
contributions from the informal sector.
2 Level of population coverage Compulsory membership of the NHIA with subsidies for
the informal sector and the poor would lead to higher
population coverage.
Inclusion of the informal sector under compulsory
membership may not be possible.
Inability to subsidize informal sector contributions and
the poor.
3 Level of equity in ﬁnancing Increased population coverage and subsidies for the
informal sector and the poor will increase equity in
ﬁnancing and access to health services.
Agreement on cross-subsidization from the formal
sector is not certain.
Development of a system to identify beneﬁciaries for
a subsidy is not yet evident.
4 Degree of ﬁnancial risk protection Smaller percentage of households experiencing
catastrophic expenditure.
Population coverage is limited and willingness to pay
insurance premiums is constrained.
5 Level of pooling Risk pooling will be maximised through compulsory
membership and merging of the pools through NHIA.
Agreement on having a single risk pool for all the
schemes is not guaranteed.
6 Level of administrative efﬁciency Reduction of administrative cost through adoption of
a common ﬁnancial management, accounting and
information system.
Coordination between participating agencies and
ministries will require high level political intervention.
7 Equity in beneﬁt package delivery; and, A common, equitable and efﬁcient, beneﬁt package
(based on budget constraints and society’s preferences)
implemented at different levels of service.
Policy decisions required for a uniform beneﬁt package
to ensure equity at the different levels (primary,
secondary and tertiary) may not be agreed to.
Reliance on Revolving Drug Fund policy is inefﬁcient.
8 Efﬁciency in beneﬁt package delivery
9 Cost effectiveness and equity in
beneﬁt package deﬁnition
A common beneﬁt package delivered under the NHIA to
the whole population at the least cost.
Resources will not be available to fund a uniform,
inclusive and equitable package.
Source: Conceptual framework as outlined in the left column based on Mathauer and Carrin (2011).
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is signiﬁcant. More broadly, key informants agreed that agreement
for sufﬁcient ﬁnancial commitment for demand-side subsidies
across government, including the Ministry of Finance, was not
certain.Enrolment and collection mechanisms
Options suggested by key informants for extending coverage
includedmandatory membership for the informal sector, allocating
direct subsidies to CBHI or contributions collected indirectly
alongside the land tax or through village chiefs, though no agreed
solution to this problemwas reported, and tax collection systems at
the village level in general were weak. While the draft Decree
proposes compulsory CBHI membership, there was concern that
raising CBHI coverage in this way presupposed a major increase in
the quality of care at contracted government facilities, requiring in
turn a major increase in the government health budget.Fund and risk pooling mechanisms
It was argued that creating a common risk pool among the four
schemes would make ﬁnancing more sustainable and provide for
cross-subsidization from the SASS and SSO schemes to the informal
sector. Some key informants proposed that direct subsidies (from
government or donors) for the poor and the informal sector be
included in the risk pool, though they understood that this could
lead to leakage in the use of funds targeted on the poor. Others
recognised that reliable information on the size of the population
requiring subsidies was not available, no comprehensive beneﬁ-
ciary identiﬁcation system existed, and no monitoring system for
veriﬁcation and control was in place for the subsidy programs. As
well, key informants suggested that the MOLSWmay not be willing
to underwrite the creation of a single risk pool with cross-
subsidization. One suggestion was not immediately to unify the
four schemes ﬁnancially but to begin with the merger of the SASS
and the SSO and later bring in the CBHI and HEF schemes.Design of the beneﬁt package
Beneﬁt packages for the different schemes are detailed in gov-
ernment guidelines, though in practice, according to key in-
formants, each facility delivered services according to the
equipment available. The beneﬁt package, they argued, must be
affordable nationally and meet provider revenue needs at the fa-
cility level; to maintain equity, beneﬁts need to be equal for equal
need, and contributions based on ability to pay. Key informants
thought moving to uniform coverage under a single national
agency would require a common beneﬁt package that is trans-
ferable between schemes and regions. Key informants believed the
management authorities of existing schemes may not support
a uniﬁed beneﬁt package if it added to costs, particularly as deliv-
ering a uniform quality of care rests on the availability of adequate
equipment and supplies.
Payment mechanisms
Key informants argued that inefﬁciencies in funding service
provision may be reduced through implementation of a consistent
and well designed provider payment mechanism. While different
provider payment mechanisms, such as capitation, fee-for-service
and case payment were proposed, key informants generally pre-
ferred using capitation payment at the primary level and case
payment or fee-for-service at the secondary and tertiary level.
Organizational challenges
Organization and stafﬁng
Key informants reported that organizational structures and
reporting arrangements of the proposed NHIA had not been
resolved and would be affected by its location e whether at the
PM’s Ofﬁce, MOLSW or MOH. A key concern was to account for
existing CBHIeHEF structures within the MOH alongside the more
well developed SASS and SSO structures within the MOLSW. The
incomplete use of existing health insurance information and
Table 4
Existing situation of six barriers in institutional design and organizational practice.
Barriers Existing situation
1 Rule absence Approval of the Decree on Health Insurance is in
the ﬁnal stage of consideration. No regulations
have been drafted to guide the implementation
of the decree.
2 Inadequate rule Questions related to compliance in the formal
sector, mandatory membership in the informal
sector, subsidized membership for the poor,
cost-sharing that is affordable and equitable,
effective risk-pooling and positive cross-
subsidisation are unresolved.
3 Contradictory rule The proposed location of the NHIA is uncertain.
Within the MOH, issues related to the roles of
service provider and purchaser threaten
a conﬂict of interest. Continued reliance on
revolving drug funds for provider payment
prevents effective purchasing. Without a single
fund pool, cross-subsidization between formal
and informal sectors cannot be guaranteed.
4 Weak rule enforcement Compliance with the compulsory formal sector
schemes is poor. Uncertainwhowill the provide
leadership, political support and incentives
needed to merge the schemes and create the
new Authority.
5 Weak organizational
capacity
Organizational and human resources capacity
for implementing the NHIA are limited,
especially at the MOH. Capacity building will
require more time.
6 Dysfunctional
inter-organizational
relationships
Divergence between theMOH andMOLSW (and
the PM Ofﬁce) restricts progress. There is a lack
of clarity on decision making structures and
mechanisms for coordination between
ministries and departments. The correct
incentives for change are not in place.
Source: Conceptual framework as outlined in the left column based on Mathauer
and Carrin (2011).
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they argued, by closer coordination between the different minis-
tries. Key informants felt that attracting scarce operational and
technical staff to the new authority from the existing agencies
(including health-systems, health-ﬁnancing, public-health man-
agement, information-technology, actuarial and ﬁnancial man-
agement specialists) could face resistance if existing departments
could not spare experienced professionals; and skilled staff may be
reluctant to move if there were uncertainties about the sustain-
ability of an NHIA. Raising government employment quotas, ca-
pacity development activities, recruiting Lao PDR staff with
international experience and recruiting professionals from the
private sector were all proposed options.
Information management system
Key informants emphasised the need for stronger information
systems to provide data on providers and members, membership
contributions and hospital statistics at the central level for deci-
sion making on management, ﬁnancing and quality improvement.
Many argued the task of unifying existing data systems for the
different SHP schemes that were developed separately would be
difﬁcult, especially in a context where vital registration is non-
existent. They also understood creating a central database is
essential to linking the existing SHP schemes and would require
technical support for building the infrastructure for information
technology.
Financial management system
Procedures for independent banking arrangements, decen-
tralized funding, a capable ﬁnancing team and guidelines for the
timely release and use of funds had not been addressed in the
draft Decree or ofﬁcial documents. Agreement about the decen-
tralisation of administration and fund disbursement was tem-
pered by different opinions about implementation arrangements
across the different schemes: the SASS and SSO already had cen-
tralised arrangements, with provincial ofﬁces, while CBHI
schemes were simply district-based. To harmonize implementa-
tion arrangements among existing schemes, some key informants
recommended the establishment of NHIA branch ofﬁces at the
provincial level while others recommended using the existing
infrastructure of one of the ministries. While some suggested
NHIA funds could to be channelled from the central level to the
district level through the provincial governments, they reported
there were no regulations currently to guarantee the timely
release of the funds to the insurer or the health provider. One of
the main difﬁculties, informants said, was the lack of ﬁnancial
management capacity due to shortage of funding and qualiﬁed
human resources.
Administration and monitoring
It was anticipated that the uniﬁcation of management, ac-
counting and statistical reporting, a common computer system and
centralised monitoring under the NHIA would reduce admin-
istrative costs currently borne by the MOH, MOLSW and other
ministries. Key informants believed high-level political inter-
vention could help reduce transaction costs caused by efﬁciencies
in coordination between the participating ministries and agencies.
They proposed that management and monitoring could be ar-
ranged efﬁciently at national, provincial and district levels with
internal and external auditing through existing procedures.
Improving capacity, particularly for monitoring and compliance,
would be required.Potential impact on health ﬁnancing performance
Based on key informant responses, Table 3 summarises the
possible impact of, and barriers to, changes in institutional design
and organizational practice under the NHIA on heath ﬁnancing
performance, following the nine performance indicators outlined
in the OASIS framework. Table 4 summarises the main bottlenecks
to institutional design and organizational change identiﬁed by
Mathauer and Carrin (2011). Brieﬂy, key informants reﬂected on the
possibility that establishing an NHIA could lead to increased gov-
ernment commitment, more complete compliance could raise
funding for health care, direct subsidies and agreement to cross
subsidies that favour the informal sector could increase equity and
ﬁnancial protection, appropriate political intervention could help
create a single risk pool and achieve administrative efﬁciencies, and
replacing the revolving drug fund policy could assist implementa-
tion of a uniform beneﬁt package and an effective provider pay-
ment mechanism.Discussion
Lesser-developed countries face particular challenges of insti-
tutional design and organizational practice in moving towards UC.
These challenges reﬂect a situation of high levels of poverty, a large
informal sector, limited resources and limited capacity for planning
and administration. Addressing these barriers requires attention to
particular elements of context, of the sequencing of reforms and of
the timescale needed for implementation.
The capacity for political leadership and government capacity
for planning and implementation are key contextual constraints.
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national health insurance as a means to compensate for limited
government ﬁnancing may face severe constraints in the collection
of revenues. TheWHOHealth Financing Strategy for the Asia Paciﬁc
Region (2010e2015) argues that universal coverage is difﬁcult to
achieve if general government health expenditure is less than 5% of
GDP (World Health Organization, 2009). In Lao PDR, general gov-
ernment health spending is less than 1% of GDP (Thomé& Pholsena,
2009, chap. 3). Though a middle-income country, the example of
Mexico indicates the level of commitment and resources required
for achieving UC as a single national program: To implement the
reform, the government increased public funding for health by 1% of
gross domestic product over seven years from 2003 (Frenk, Gómez-
Dantés, & Knaul, 2009). In LDCs too, governments face a political
choice in deﬁning their national health insurance proposals either
as a non-tax revenue raising exercise or as a program that provides
effective social health protection. Clearly, a balance is needed be-
tween the two.
In Lao PDR, while the draft NHI Decree establishes the govern-
ment’s policy commitment to achieving universal coverage, there is
little consensus among policy makers and key stakeholders on the
proposed arrangements. The government pledges to provide a tax
exemption for the NHIA, guarantee the supply of staff and funding
for management, and extend the national health insurance scheme
nationally, and it looks to all economic sectors, both domestic and
foreign investors, to contribute to the development of NHI. How-
ever, the revenue raising proposals of the draft Decree indicate that
the government sees the proposal for NHI mainly as an opportunity
for cost-sharing among households and revenue-raising outside
the national budget. While expanding the revenue base for national
health insurance is a legitimate aim of the reform, policy makers
have not made clear whether additional revenues can be collected
without adding to household co-payments and OOP expenditures.
Countries must deﬁne their own path to UC within parameters
that are consistent with overall health ﬁnancing goals (Kutzin,
2012; World Health Organization, 2010), though outcomes will
depend on the national priority given to the health sector (Kutzin,
2008). This implies that the sequence given to the implementation
of reforms will be decisive. LDC governments are unlikely to have
the resources or the capacity to implement UC as a single national
reform. The example of Thailand, now a middle-income country,
shows that sequencing reforms is effective and necessary. While
Thailand boasts a universal coverage system, it has not yet formed
a single risk pool across its three main universal coverage schemes
for civil servants, formally employed workers and the informal
sector (Tangcharoensathien et al., 2011).
Unifying risk pools for different sections of the population may
not be practicable initially. Guaranteeing coverage of the poor is
a logical ﬁrst step (Gwatkin & Ergo, 2010). As well, in countries like
Lao PDR, coverage of the expansive informal sector remains an
unresolved challenge. In Vietnam, while the government has uni-
ﬁed its Health Care Fund for the Poor with formal-sector social
health insurance through Vietnam Social Security, coverage of the
informal sector remains incomplete (Tien et al., 2011). Thailand
provides an example of effective coverage of the informal sector
with tax-based funding (Tangcharoensathien et al., 2011). The
proposal for mandatory coverage of the informal sector in Laos PDR
(supported by a government subsidy for 50% of premium rates) is
a response to the failure of voluntary coverage schemes there.
However, it is precisely the disparate nature of such a population
group that prevents mandatory enrolment.
Reforms must therefore occur in a logical order depending on
the status of health ﬁnancing arrangements within the country.
Establishing the institutional and organizational structures needed
for UC may provide the means for countries to devise the healthﬁnancing policy settings needed to expand coverage. This may be
thought of as a process of learning by doing. In such a process, the
understanding that such reforms require an extended period is
critical. In Kenya, for example, proposals for a national health in-
surance agency appeared in 2004. Differences among stakeholders
and concerns within parliament, however, prevented imple-
mentation of the plan. Reviewing the situation, Carrin et al. (2007)
recommended a well-prepared transition period of perhaps a dec-
ade based on establishing a national health insurance fund and
then meeting the challenges of implementation.
In Lao PDR, it appears the NHIA has been conceived as a plan-
ning and preparatory body rather than an implementing agency.
While it has been deﬁned as an organization designed to imple-
ment the health insurance policy, ‘implementation’ in this context
has more the sense of managing the movement towards estab-
lishment of a national authority than organizing a national insur-
ance agency. Evidence for policy making may be derived from
international experience. It may also come from piloting and
evaluation within the country. The evidence from Lao PDR shows
the need for greater attention to institutional rules, organizational
structures, strengthening capacity for policy development and
decision making, improved mobilization of resources and stronger
administrative capacity across government. These challenges are
not unique to Lao PDR but are evident in other lower-income
countries, in which a well-prepared transition period, based on
establishing a national health insurance fund and then meeting the
challenges of implementation, may be required.
Conclusion
This article aims to ﬁll a gap. While the principles of universal
coverage are widely accepted, the means for moving towards UC
goals in LDCs is poorly documented and the evidence base is
limited. Lao PDR provides one example of a lower-income country
in which there is a small formal sector, a large informal sector, and
signiﬁcant poverty. This situation constrains ﬁscal resources, limits
revenue collection opportunities and reduces the potential for
positive cross-subsidization. Reﬂecting a global concern, the Lao
PDR example conﬁrms that voluntary insurance is inappropriate for
coverage of the large informal sector. Despite the hopes of some Lao
PDR policy makers, mandatory membership of insurance schemes
may be prevented by the disparate nature of the informal sector,
and a mix of tax subsidies and health insurance is required. Cross
subsidization from formal-sector schemes may appear attractive
but raises a number of technical and ﬁnancial concerns. In lower-
income countries, the means for moving towards universal cover-
age may be seen therefore as a process of capacity development.
Having adopted the strategy of universal coverage, many
countries now face the challenges of implementation as a national
reform in the health ﬁnancing system. In LDCs, the most immediate
steps along this path include extensive change and reform to the
institutional design and organizational practice elements of the
three health ﬁnancing functions. Dealing with these challenges
demands that three concepts be strengthened in the analytical
framework. In considering the national context more attention is
needed to the process by which national capacity for planning and
implementation may be strengthened, rather than simply ac-
counting for the shortcomings. The nature and sequencing of re-
forms, including interventions required to prepare the
establishment of a single national risk pool, need fuller consid-
eration in order that preliminary changes may pave the way for
effective implementation of broader reforms. And the timescale
required for introducing universal coverage, which will be longer-
term rather than immediate, needs to be carefully measured. Uni-
versal coverage is possible; the challenge now is how to achieve it.
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